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I. Introduction
Vietnam agreed in its Protocol of Accession to the World
Trade Organization ("WTO")' that WTO Members could use the
generally unfavourable non-market economy ("NME")
methodology when conducting anti-dumping ("AD") 2 and
countervailing duty ("CVD") 3 investigations, including, but not
limited, to the use of factor of production data from "surrogate"
countries in substitution for action Vietnamese production data.4
This unavoidable concession results in a continuing risk of
anti-dumping, and recently, countervailing duty actions against
Vietnamese exports, particularly those actions brought in United
States and the European Union. The methodology has typically
resulted in exaggerated dumping margins, as in Frozen Fish Fillets
where the margins were in excess of forty-four percent. This is
not always the case. The Vietnamese margins in the initial
investigation in Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair
Value: Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp From the
I See World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the Socialist
Republic of Viet Nam, WT/L/662 (Nov. 15, 2006) (incorporating the Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, T 255, WT/ACC/VNM/48 (Oct. 27,
2006)) [hereinafter Vietnamese Accession Protocol].
2 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. VI, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]; Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Dec. 15, 1993, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal Instruments -
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 U.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Anti-dumping
Agreement] (allowing for antidumping duties where export products are sold at less than
fair value and cause material injury or threat of material injury to producers in the
importing country).
3 See GATT 1947, supra note 2, arts. VI, XVI; Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Dec. 15, 1993, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex lA, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
U.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SCM Agreement] (allowing for countervailing duties to
be imposed when the subject imports are shown to enjoy government subsidies that
confer a benefit, and such subsidies cause material injury or threat of material injury to
producers in the importing country).
4 See, e.g., Notice of Final Antidumping Duty Determination of Sales at Less Than
Fair Value and Affirmative Critical Circumstances: Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 68 Fed. Reg. 37116 (June 23, 2003) [hereinafter Frozen
Fish Fillets].
5 See Frozen Fish Fillets, 68 Fed. Reg. at 37121.
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Socialist Republic of Vietnam were in the six percent range,6 i.e.,
near normal. In the CVD area these methods relate primarily to
the use of non-national "benchmarks" when calculating the
"benefit" from certain government subsidy programs,7 permitting
the rejection of national data when government control of financial
institutions or property leasing has led to data distortion or
misrepresentation.8
In April 2009, The Department of Commerce ("DOC" or
"Commerce") initiated AD and CVD actions against Vietnam
relating to Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags ("PRCBs"), the
plastic bags used for packaging dry cleaning and other consumer
products.9 The action against Vietnamese producers followed a
number of CVD actions by the United States against China
beginning in 2006 to and the two earlier AD actions against
Vietnam mentioned above. " In August 2009, Commerce
preliminarily determined the existence of actionable subsidies,
albeit at relatively low sub-three percent rates in most instances. 12
These findings were essentially confirmed in the final CVD
determination, with CVD margins ranging from 0.44 percent (de
minimis) to 5.28 percent except for one firm for which "adverse
facts available" ("AFA") were used, resulting in much higher
margins. 13 The preliminary AD determination led to considerably
6 See Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain
Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp From the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 69 Fed.
Reg. 71005, 71009 (Dec. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Shrimp).
7 Working Party Report, Vietnam - Report of the Working Party on the Accession
of Viet Nam, 255, WT/ACC/VNM/48 (Oct. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Vietnam Working
Party Report].
8 See id. T 254.
9 See Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final
Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination, 74
Fed. Reg. 45811, 45811-13 (Sept. 4, 2009) [hereinafter PRCB Preliminary CVD
Determination].
10 See, e.g., Coated Free Sheet Paper From the People's Republic of China:
Amended Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 Fed. Reg.
17484 (Apr. 9, 2007).
11 See supra text accompanying notes 2, 3.
12 See PRCB Preliminary CVD Determination, 74 Fed. Reg. at 45820.
13 See Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags From the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 75 Fed. Reg. 16428, 16430 (Apr.
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higher margins, from 52.3 percent to 76.11 percent;14 those results
were confirmed without change in the final AD determination,
since none of the parties participated further in the proceedings.' 5
In the AD proceedings, the magnitude of the margins was
exaggerated by Commerce's use of AFA, 16 explained in Part
VI(B),17 with the result that the AD case is of little use in further
illuminating Commerce practice in this third AD action against
Vietnam.' 8
The NME approach, particularly as it is applied in CVD
actions, will likely continue to bedevil both the Vietnamese
government and Vietnamese exporters to the United States unless
the United States follows the lead of New Zealand and Australia
by affording Vietnam market economy ("ME") treatment for some
or all manufacturing sectors.' 9 Such action seems highly unlikely
at the present time. Moreover, while there have been no European
Union ("EU") CVD actions against Vietnam,20 the EU recently
initiated such an action against China, relating to alleged Chinese
subsidies of glossy paper. 1 The risks of similar EU proceedings
against Vietnam, although perhaps not immediate, are obvious.
In many respects, the NME issue, at least from an economic
1, 2010) [hereinafter PRCB Final CVD Determination].
14 See Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags From the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Postponement of Final
Determination, 74 Fed. Reg. 56813, 56819 (Nov. 3, 2009) [hereinafter PRCB
Preliminary AD Determination].
15 See Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 75 Fed. Reg. 16434, 16434-35
(Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinafter PRCB Final AD Determination].
16 Id.
17 See infra note 18.
18 PRCB Final AD Determination, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56819.
19 See Australian Ministry of Trade, Press Release, Market Economy Status for
Vietnam (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2009/sc_018.html.
20 See World Trade Organization, Disputes By Agreement (as cited in request for
consultation),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispu agreementsjindexe.htm?id=A20#s
elected agreement (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (listing disputes against Member nations
by other Member nations).
21 Joe Kirwin, EU Investigates Chinese Glossy Paper, Marks First-Ever China
Anti-Subsidy Probe, 27 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 580 (Apr. 22, 2010) (describing the
institution of an investigation by the European Commission into Chinese subsidies).
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point of view, is not whether the Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China and the Vietnamese Accession
Protocol legally permit entities such as the United States and the
EU to treat China and Vietnam differently in AD and CVD
actions. However, regardless of the legal issue, it makes little
economic sense to contend that there is a clear, economy-wide
divide between NMEs and MEs in such circumstances, even if the
level of government involvement in the economy in MNEs, such
as China and Vietnam, remains considerably greater than in most
so-called MEs. As the discussion of Georgetown Steel Corp. v.
United States22 indicates, the traditional distinction between NMEs
and MEs in U.S. CVD practice, precluding the use of CVD actions
against the former, evolved more than twenty-five years ago when
a sharp division existed between centrally-planned economies
such as the Soviet Union, and those in which factors of production
and selling prices are determined by market forces. This
distinction has blurred greatly in recent years.23
Clearly, the Chinese and Vietnamese governments continue to
play major roles in their economies. Many government decisions
and policies distort the market system. Examples include
government control of commercial banking, land use prices, and
industry favouritism. 24 Many other governments have been
interfering extensively in major sectors of the economy. For
example, the United States has heavily regulated the banking,
mortgage loans, health care and the automobile sectors.25 The
major world economies may well be entering an era shifting away
from the "laissez faire" approach to government regulation and
participation in the economy, a trend which began during the
22 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(discussed infra Part III).
23 See Adam McCarty & Carl Kalapesi, The Economics of the "Non-Market
Economy" Issue: Vietnam Catfish Case Study 4 (Vietnamese Ministry of Economics,
Working Paper, Jan. 29, 2003).
24 See Philippe Auffret, Trade Reform in Vietnam: Opportunities with Emerging
Challenges 5-8 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3076, June 2003)
(describing existing concerns regarding state-owned industries and state-owned banks in
Vietnam).
25 See Andrew Martin, Give Him Liberty, but Not a Bailout, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2,
2009, at Bl, B6 (discussing the varying amounts of United States governmental
involvement in banking, the automotive industry, health care, and mortgage loans).
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Reagan era in the United States and the Thatcher era in the United
Kingdom, and has since spread elsewhere. Governments'
reactions to the "Great Recession" of 2009 suggest that efforts to
characterize economies as NME or ME will likely make less
economic sense for purposes of applying national unfair trade
laws.
Vietnam and China must deal with the realities of United
States law and practice, and with the obligations the two
governments accepted when acceding to the WTO, for some years
to come. Moreover, because the United States, EU, and other
WTO Members are much more concerned about China's exports
than Vietnam's, any major change by WTO members in treatment
of Vietnam likely depends on a policy change with regard to
China, since the rationale for NME treatment is similar for both
nations. Because few WTO Members other than the United
States, the European Union and Canada commonly bring CVD
actions, the threat of trade disruption from AD actions is a more
serious concern for both Vietnam and China.26
The focus of this article is the PCRB CVD action brought in
the United States against Vietnam. CVD actions against China
have been discussed elsewhere. 27 Part II discusses the WTO
requirements for applying NME methodology to WTO Members
in both AD and CVD actions, as reflected in the Chinese and
Vietnamese WTO accession agreements. Part III addresses U.S.
NME law and practice, focusing on the determination that
Vietnam is a NME for antidumping actions in Frozen Fish Fillets.
Part IV briefly reviews the methodology used by the United States
authorities in bringing CVD actions against China beginning in
2006. Part V addresses key aspects of the U.S. agency
determinations - CVD, AD and injury-in PRCBs, with emphasis
26 World Trade Organization, Countervailing Initiations: By Reporting Member
01/01/1995 - 31/12/2009,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/scm_e/cvdinit rep member e.pdf (displaying all
215 CVD investigations reported to the WTO between Jan. 2, 1995, and Dec. 31, 2008,
179 of which were brought by five Members: the United States (88), EU (48), Canada
(23), South Africa, (11), and Australia (9)).
27 See, e.g., James P. Durling, Encountering Rocky Shoals: Application of the CVD
Law to China, GULC Int'l Trade Update, 2010 WL 956090, Feb. 2010; G. Bowman, N.
Covelli, D. Gantz, I. Uhm, TRADE REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 128-30 (Kluwer Int'l,
2010).
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on the ground-breaking CVD analysis. Part VI reviews a key
CVD action which was unsuccessfully challenged in the WTO's
Dispute Settlement Body against Canada, a market economy,
regarding Canadian softwood lumber. The case blurs ME and
NMiE distinctions in critical aspects of United States CVD
practice. The article also discusses briefly, in Part VII, the
prospects for questioning the United States' NME practices "as
applied"28 in the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO ("Dispute
Settlement Body"),29 as with recent Chinese challenges to United
States 30 and EU practices. ' Part VIII is a brief summary and
conclusion.
II. WTO Requirements Governing MNE Treatment for China
and Vietnam
Both China and Vietnam were required as a condition of
accession to accept special and less favorable treatment with
regard to AD and CVD actions brought by other Members against
them.32 Thus, in the author's view the use of NME methodology
will be virtually impossible to challenge successfully "as such"
before the Dispute Settlement Body; whether challenges to such
legislation "as applied" will be feasible remains to be seen and are
discussed briefly below. However, also as discussed below, there
may be other avenues which would permit challenges in Geneva.
28 See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by China, United States -
Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 3-
7, WT/DS379, Dec. 12, 2008 (providing an example of "as applied" disputes).
29 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
30 See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by China, supra note 28.
31 See Request for Consultations by China, European Communities - Definitive
Anti-Dumping Measures On Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners From China, WT/DS397/1,
Aug. 4, 2009.
32 See World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People's
Republic of China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001) (incorporating the Report of the Working
Party on the Accession of China, 1 150, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (October 1, 2001))
[hereinafter Chinese Accession Agreement]; Vietnam Working Party Report, supra note
7, 255.
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A. China's Accession Agreement
In 2001, China, upon entering the WTO, accepted the SCM
Agreement and the applicability of its provisions relating to CVD
actions. 33 Also, China agreed in its WTO Accession Agreement to
the following language:
15. Price Comparability in Determining Subsidies and
Dumping
Article VI of the GATT 1994, the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("Anti-Dumping Agreement") and
the SCM Agreement shall apply in proceedings involving
imports of Chinese origin into a WTO Member consistent
with the following:
(a) In determining price comparability under Article VI
of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
the importing WTO Member shall use either Chinese
prices or costs for the industry under investigation or a
methodology that is not based on a strict comparison
with domestic prices or costs in China based on the
following rules:
(i) If the producers under investigation can clearly
show that market economy conditions prevail in the
industry producing the like product with regard to
the manufacture, production and sale of that
product, the importing WTO Member shall use
Chinese prices or costs for the industry under
investigation in determining price comparability;
(ii) The importing WTO Member may use a
methodology that is not based on a strict
comparison with domestic prices or costs in China
if the producers under investigation cannot clearly
show that market economy conditions prevail in the
industry producing the like product with regard to
manufacture, production and sale of that product.
(b) In proceedings under Parts II, III and V of the SCM
Agreement, when addressing subsidies described in
Articles 14(a), 14(b), 14(c) and 14(d), relevant
provisions of the SCM Agreement shall apply;
33 See Chinese Accession Agreement, supra note 32, 10.1.
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however, if there are special difficulties in that
application, the importing WTO Member may then use
methodologies for identiying and measuring the
subsidy benefit which take into account the possibility
that prevailing terms and conditions in China may not
always be available as appropriate benchmarks. In
applying such methodologies, where practicable, the
importing WTO Member should adjust such prevailing
terms and conditions before considering the use of
terms and conditions prevailing outside China.
(c) The importing WTO Member shall notify
methodologies used in accordance with subparagraph
(a) to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices and
shall notify methodologies used in accordance with
subparagraph (b) to the Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures.
(d) Once China has established, under the national law
of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market
economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be
terminated provided that the importing Member's
national law contains market economy criteria as of the
date of accession. In any event, the provisions of
subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the
date of accession. In addition, should China establish,
pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO
Member, that market economy conditions prevail in a
particular industry or sector, the non-market economy
provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply
to that industry or sector. 4
It is clear from the above that the effective waiver by China
applies to CVD (paragraph 15(b)) as well as AD actions
(paragraph 15(a)). Thus, in AD actions, a "strict comparison with
domestic prices or costs in China" will not be required.35 The
SCM Agreement lacks an explicit bar to determining the
"comparable commercial loan" rate through the use of non-
national benchmarks; thus, such benchmarks explicitly may be
used pursuant to subparagraph (b).36 The only requirements are
34 Id. 15 (emphasis added).
35 Id.
36 SCM Agreement, supra note 3, art. 14.
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coverage in national legislation regulations and transparency when
such methods are used, 37 although the use of non-national
benchmarks is among those before a panel in the judicial case
brought by China. As an additional hurdle, the burden assigned by
the Accession Agreement is very much on the foreign producers
(in paragraph 15 a)(i)) to "clearly show" that market economy
conditions exist. Otherwise, the investigating authorities are
permitted to continue using NME analysis. 9 While the
authorization for use of NME methodology with regard to AD
actions (paragraph (a) above) expires after 15 years, the use of
NME methodology for subsidy actions carries no such expiration
date.40
Apart from the accession agreement, the SCM Agreement will
likely not assist China or Vietnam to avoid the impact of the NME
methodology in either AD or CVD cases. It is the author's
understanding that the United States does not recognize China as a
developing country that is subject to the two percent de minimis
requirement for subsidy margins, in contrast to the one percent
applicable to WTO developing country members under the SCM
Agreement. 4 1 However, Commerce has not fully rejected the
possible treatment of Vietnam as a developing country for this
42purpose.
B. Vietnam 's WTO Accession
The Vietnam Working Party Report reflects the WTO's
experience with China five years earlier, and largely tracks the
language in China's WTO Accession Agreement 43 The
37 See id.
38 Chinese Accession Agreement, supra note 32, 15(a)(i).
39 Id. 15(a)(ii).
40 See id. T 15(d).
41 See SCM Agreement, supra note 3, 11.9.
42 Compare PRCB Preliminary CVD Determination, 74 Fed. Reg. at 45820
(recognizing only the margins below one percent as de minimis with U.S. Dep. of
Commerce, Issues and Decision Memorandum for Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags
from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determination, Mar. 25, 2010, http://ia.ita.doc.gov/fm/summary/vietnam/2010-7395-
1.pdf (recognizing the argument for margins below two percent to qualify as de minimis
but deciding the issue has been mooted)).
43 See, e.g., Vietnam Working Party Report, infra text accompanying note 51.
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Vietnamese Working Party Report provides in pertinent part:
254. Several Members noted that Viet Nam was
continuing the process of transition towards a full market
economy. Those Members noted that under those
circumstances, in the case of imports of Vietnamese origin
into a WTO Member, special difficulties could exist in
determining cost and price comparability in the context of
anti-dumping investigations and countervailing duty
investigations. Those Members stated that in such cases,
the importing WTO Member might find it necessary to take
into account the possibility that a strict comparison with
domestic costs and prices in Viet Nam might not always be
appropriate.
255. The representative of Viet Nam confirmed that, upon
accession, the following would apply-Article VI of the
GATT 1994, the Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
("Anti-Dumping Agreement") and the SCM Agreement
shall apply in proceedings involving exports from Viet
Nam into a WTO Member consistent with the following:
(a) In determining price comparability under Article VI
of the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement,
the importing WTO Member shall use either
Vietnamese prices or costs for the industry under
investigation or a methodology that is not based on a
strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in Viet
Nam based on the following rules:
(i) If the producers under investigation can clearly
show that market economy conditions prevail in the
industry producing the like product with regard to
the manufacture, production and sale of that
product, the importing WTO Member shall use
Vietnamese prices or costs for the industry under
investigation in determining price comparability;
(ii) The importing WTO Member may use a
methodology that is not based on a strict
comparison with domestic prices or costs in Viet
Nam if the producers under investigation cannot
clearly show that market economy conditions
prevail in the industry producing the like product
with regard to manufacture, production and sale of
95
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that product.
(b) In proceedings under Parts II, III and V of the SCM
Agreement, when addressing subsidies, the relevant
provisions of the SCM Agreement shall apply;
however, if there are special difficulties in that
application, the importing WTO Member may then use
alternative methodologies for identifying and
measuring the subsidy benefit which take into account
the possibility that prevailing terms and conditions in
Viet Nam may not be available as appropriate
benchmarks.
(c) The importing WTO Member shall notify
methodologies used in accordance with subparagraph
(a) to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices and
shall notify methodologies used in accordance with
subparagraph (b) to the Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures.
(d) Once Viet Nam has established, under the national
law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market
economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be
terminated provided that the importing Member's
national law contains market economy criteria as of the
date of accession. In any event, the provisions of
subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire on 31 December
2018. In addition, should Viet Nam establish, pursuant
to the national law of the importing WTO Member, that
market economy conditions prevail in a particular
industry or sector, the non-market economy provisions
of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to that
industry or sector.
The Working Party took note of these commitments.4
The United States and other WTO Members rely on this
language when they use a surrogate country approach in
antidumping actions against Vietnam or choose non-Vietnamese
"benchmarks" in CVD actions for determining the benefit
extended to Vietnamese producers when loans are extended at
"preferential" rates and are challenged through national
44 Vietnam Working Party Report, supra note 7, 1 254-55 (emphasis added).
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countervailing duty actions.45 The bulk of the language deals with
AD actions, but paragraph 254 explicitly applies to both, and as
with China puts the onus on Vietnam and Vietnamese enterprises
46
to demonstrate ME status in a particular industry sector. With
regard to CVD actions, the national authorities have considerable
discretion in deciding whether there exist "special circumstances"
justifying the use of non-national benchmarks in measuring the
benefit of a government subsidy to Vietnamese producers.47 With
Vietnam, as with China, the expiration date for the use of NME
methodology in AD actions (2018) does not apply to CVD
actions.48 As with Softwood Lumber, discussed infra Part VII, the
use of external benchmarks to calculate subsidy benefits is not
totally dependent on the Vietnamese and Chinese accession
agreements, but is independently authorized in the SCM
49Agreement.
Nevertheless, it may be feasible, depending on the facts and
circumstances of particular cases, for China or Vietnam to
challenge the EU or United States AD laws in the Dispute
Settlement Body "as applied" for failure to use the market-
oriented industry approach "if the producers under investigation
can clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the
industry producing the like product with regard to the
manufacture, production and sale of that product," as set out
above.o However, to date no such challenges have been lodged.
By analogy, use of non-national data in CVD actions may also
be vulnerable if the independence of relevant agencies from the
government can be supported. It also seems reasonable to
speculate that the Appellate Body would not permit the United
States or other WTO Members to ignore the market-oriented
economy exception to NME treatment in AD actions. If Vietnam
could show that some commercial banks operating in Vietnam are
free of government controls when interest rates are determined, the
use of a pool of foreign bank interest rates for CVD.benefit
45 Id. 255(b), 272.
46 Id. 251-55.
47 Id. 27.
48 Id. 255(d).
49 See SCM Agreement, supra note 3, art. 14.
50 Vietnam Working Party Report, supra note 7, T 255(a)(i).
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calculations in lieu of Vietnamese commercial bank rates could be
challenged.5'
III. United States NME Law
Paragraphs 255(c) and (d) of Vietnam's Working Party Report,
quoted above, indicate that where NME methodologies are used
by WTO Members those methodologies must be incorporated in
national laws and regulations, as well as notified to the WTO.52
For example, once Vietnam was to establish "under the national
law of the importing WTO Member" that it is a market economy,
it must be treated as such.53 Under such circumstances, national
law is controlling assuming that it is consistent with WTO rules.
A. United States Antidumping Law and NMEs
Certain aspects of the AD laws are also relevant to an
understanding of the new CVD policy relating to NMEs. United
States antidumping law, as it applies to NMEs, defines an NME as
"any foreign country that the administering authority [Department
of Commerce] determines does not operate on market principles of
cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such
country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise." 54 Based
on this statute, Commerce in general refuses to calculate dumping
margins based on selling prices in the home market, as is the
normal approach for ME countries when those prices and related
selling costs are determined not by market factors but through
central planning.5 5 Instead, Commerce looks to a "surrogate"
country, such as India or Bangladesh, where Commerce believes
production and selling costs are determined by market forces in a
nation or nations at a similar level of development.56 The labor,
materials and other costs associated with the production and sale
of the same or similar products in those countries are effectively
51 At present there is little evidence of the independence of government-owned
commercial banks from government influence over the setting of interest rates. See id.
9-13.
52 See id. at 255(c)-(d).
S3 Id. T 255(d).
54 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (2010).
55 See Frozen Fish Fillets, 68 Fed. Reg. at 37116, 37119-20 (June 23, 2003).
56 See id. at 37120.
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substituted in making the calculations.
The factors considered by Commerce in deciding whether a
country should be treated as an NME for antidumping purposes
are:
i) the extent to which the currency is convertible;
ii) the extent to which wage rates are determined by
free bargaining between labor and management;
iii) the extent to which joint ventures or other
investments by foreign firms are permitted;
iv) the extent of government ownership or control of
the means of production;
v) the extent of government control over the allocation
of resources and over the price and output decisions
of enterprises, and
vi) such other factors that [Commerce] considers
appropriate.
These factors, particularly the catchall provision (vi), provide
the Commerce Department with broad discretion, which
Commerce has not been reluctant to utilize, in analyzing NME
issues.
The analysis used and conclusions reached by Commerce in its
decision to utilize NME methodology for Vietnam in the initial
U.S. AD action against Vietnam, Frozen Fish Fillets in 2002, are
instructive. Commerce concluded that while Vietnam had made
significant progress implementing a variety of reforms,
Commerce's analysis indicated that Vietnam had not successfully
made the transition to a market economy.59 Commerce noted that
prices and costs were central to the Department's dumping
analysis and calculation of "Normal Value." 60 Commerce
determined the following evidence of a market-driven economy
was important: "[W]ages are largely determined by free
57 See id.
58 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(B) (2010).
59 See U.S. Dep. of Commerce, Memorandum - Antidumping Duty Investigation
of Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam - Determination of
Market Economy Status, 1, Nov. 8, 2002,
http://www.usvtc.org/trade/other/antidumping/catfish/vietnam-market-status-
determination.pdf.
60 Id. at 7.
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bargaining between labor and management [and] ... various legal
reforms have led to the marked and sustained growth of the private
sector." 6 1 However, Commerce also determined that:
[T]he level of government intervention in the economy is
still such that prices and costs are not a meaningful
measure of value. The Vietnamese currency ... is not
fully convertible .... Foreign direct investment is
encouraged, but the government still seeks to direct and
control it through regulation. Likewise, although prices
have been liberalized for the most part, the Government
Pricing Committee continues to maintain discretionary
control over prices in sectors that extend beyond those
typically viewed as natural monopolies. Privatization of
SOEs and the state-dominated banking sector has been
slow, thereby excluding the private sector from access to
resources and insulating the state sector from
competition... [P]rivate land ownership is not allowed and
the government is not initiating a land privatization
program.... [Finally,] [r]ule of law is particularly weak in
Vietnam: laws are vague, the judiciary is not independent
of the Communist Party, there are few lawyers ... [and]
many FIEs have included a provision in their contracts that
disputes be handled by the Singapore Court of
Arbitration.62
There had clearly been substantial progress in Vietnam toward
more free market orientation in many of these categories in recent
years, particularly foreign law and private land ownership, but full
satisfaction of the technical economic requirements is probably
some years away.
Notably, many of the steps Vietnam would need to implement
to convince Commerce on legal grounds to move it to market
economy status for anti-dumping actions are similar to those that
Vietnam must take to comply fully with its WTO obligations, and
to assure that the current rapid rate of economic development, job
creation and eradication of poverty continues.63 Interestingly, in
61 Id. at 1-2.
62 Id. at 2, 41.
63 Compare id. (addressing factors the Department of Commerce analyzes in
determining ME status) with Vietnam Working Party Report, supra note 7 (outlining
methods by which Vietnam planned to address social and economic issues as obligated
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the PRCB Preliminary CVD Determination, Commerce effectively
reassessed the statutory NME factors in the Vietnam context,
albeit as the basis for rejecting Vietnamese commercial bank loans
as a benchmark for calculating the subsidies. 64 Since the
producers had not requested a review of Vietnam's NME status in
the AD action, no such review was conducted.65
The NME, or market-economy determination, is political as
well as economic in the United States. It would likely be
politically difficult for the United States to graduate Vietnam
before it graduates China. China is some years ahead of Vietnam
in developing a vibrant private sector, but China's enormous trade
surplus with the United States is such that any action to reduce the
level of protection provided by United States antidumping laws
against China is unthinkable. Although the order of magnitude of
the United States trade deficit is much smaller with Vietnam,
which enjoyed a trade surplus with the United States of $9.2
billion on total trade of $15.4 billion in 2009,66 the same rationale
is applicable to Vietnam. This is reflected in the communiqu6
issued by President George Bush and Prime Minister Dung in
Washington D.C. in June 2008.67 Prime Minister Dung had
requested that Vietnam be accorded NME status in antidumping
68
actions. President Bush simply "acknowledged" the Vietnamese
request; he made no promise to study or review the request as was
done with other issues raised by Vietnam.69
Review and change of practice by the United States regarding
NME treatment has often been affected by political and economic
considerations. In what is perhaps the most relevant recent action
in 2002, the United States agreed that Russia had made the
by its accession to the WTO).
64 See PRCB Preliminary CVD Determination, 74 Fed. Reg. 45811, 45815-16
(Sept. 4, 2009).
65 See generally id. (determining CVDs only).
66 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S.-Vietnam Trade Facts,
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/Vietnam (last visited Oct.
26, 2010).
67 See Press Release, Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the United
States of America, Vietnam and US Leaders Meet, Issue Joint Statement, (June 24,
2008), http://www.vietnamembassy-usa.org/news/story.php?d=20080627045153.
68 See id.
69 Id.
101
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
transition to a market economy and accordingly determined that
from that time forward Russian costs and prices, and not surrogate
country prices, would be used in antidumping actions against
Russia.7 0 Because the United States did not follow a practice of
bringing CVD actions against NMEs at the time, the U.S. decision
to treat Russia as a market economy for AD purposes also meant
that CVD actions could be brought against Russia. 71 This
determination was legally based on the requirements of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(18)(B), 72 discussed in Part IV(A), but undoubtedly had a
political overtone, as it took place during a period in which the
Bush Administration was strongly seeking better economic and
political relations. Presumably, a decision to afford market
economy status to China or Vietnam, if and when it occurs, will
also be affected by factors beyond the statutory criteria as well.
Recent actions in Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand also
demonstrate that the WTO time periods for applying NME
methodology are not immutable. In Mexico, a substantial number
of the antidumping duties applied to goods imported from China
were terminated or scheduled for termination over a three-year
period beginning in October 2008.74 These actions were taken in
accordance with a bilateral agreement between Mexico and China
that concluded in June 2008 and was approved by the Mexican
Senate. 5 However, the affected list of products was incorporated
70 See Andrew L. Stoler, Executive Director, Inst. for Int'l Bus., Econ. and L.,
Presentation to Forum on WTO System & Protectionism: Challenges China Faces After
WTO Accession: Treatment of China as a Non-Market Economy: Implications for
Antidumping and Countervailing Measures and Impact on Chinese Company Operations
in the WTO Framework, 5, Dec. 1, 2003,
http://www.iit.adelaide.edu.auldocs/Shanghai%20Speech.pdf (discussing Russia's
transition to ME status under United States practice).
71 See id.
72 See supra text accompanying note 56.
73 See infra note 74.
74 See Adriin Vazquez, Horacio A. L6pez-Portillo & Veronica Vdzquez Bravo,
International Law Office, Anti-dumping Duty Agreement Marks New Dawn for Trade
with China (Oct. 24, 2008),
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g-64a54f5d-aecl-4f02-
ac93-9828f0b9d461.
75 See Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de Mexico y el Gobierno
del la Rept6blica Popular de China en Materia de Medidas de Remedio Comercial
[hereinafter Transition Agreement on Trade Remedies], D.O., Oct. 13, 2008,
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in China's WTO Accession Protocol, which permitted Mexico to
depart from WTO rules with respect to restrictions on those
products for a period of six years, which expired in 2007.76 The
accord does not prevent Mexico from continuing to treat China as
an NME with regard to other products subject to antidumping
investigations for the remainder of the 15 year period specified in
China's Accession Protocol,n although such a change in policy is
not inconceivable. Nor is there any provision in Mexico's Foreign
Trade Law that would prevent Mexico from using NME
methodology for antidumping actions against other nations such as
Vietnam, but there have been no Mexican unfair trade actions
against Vietnam to date. Since Mexico rarely initiates CVD
actions, NME treatment by Mexico is not a significant issue for
China (or Vietnam).
With Australia (and New Zealand), the decision to revert to
market economy status analysis for Vietnam (but not for China)
recognized that "Vietnam has made substantial market access
commitments under AANZFTA [ASEAN-Atstralia-New Zealand
Free Trade Agreement] .", That determination was not made in
isolation but, as the Australian ministry observed, in the context of
the FTA negotiations, and applies both to AD and CVD actions.79
This suggests, among other things, that it may be useful for
Vietnam to continue participating in the U.S. sponsored Trans-
Pacific Partnership ("TPP") negotiations of an FTA with
Australia, Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Peru and Singapore. It is
www.apparelandfootwear.org/letters/acuerdochinmex061308.pdf. The agreement
consists of two pages of text and approximately fifty pages of annexes specifying the
phase-out of the antidumping duties between 2008 and 2011. See id.
76 See Chinese Accession Agreement, supra note 32, at Annex 7.
77 See id.
78 Australian Press Release, supra note 19.
79 See id.
80 See Amy Tsui, Negotiators Discuss How to Start Drafting Texts for Next Round
of TPP Talks in October, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Jun. 16, 2010) available at
http://lawlibproxy2.unc.edu:2061/tdln/TDLNWB/split display.adp?fedfid=17298678&v
name=itdbulallissues&fcn=1&wsn-497411500&fn=17298678&split-0 (last visited
Sept. 9, 2010) (discussing procedures and various issues relating to the TPP). As of
June, Vietnam was participating in the negotiations on a provisional basis, and the
government had not decided whether to endorse fully the negotiations. A U.S. -
ASEAN FTA, like that negotiated with the participation of Australia and New Zealand,
is not currently politically feasible for the United States because of Burma's membership
103
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
questionable whether the United States would agree to change
NME treatment of Vietnam in a multilateral FTA.
Market-oriented Industry. Commerce has the authority to treat
a particular industry or enterprise (as distinct from the economy as
a whole) in accordance with market principles even if those
principles are not applied to other sectors of the economy. This is
reflected in the discussion of Vietnam's working party report
commitments discussed in Part II 81 Commerce requires for
purposes of the affected sector a showing that: (1) there is virtually
no government involvement in determining prices or production
quantities; (2) there is private or collective (rather than full
government) ownership; and (3) that all significant inputs are
subject to market-determined prices.8 2 This "MOI" treatment has
not been granted in NME situations affecting Vietnam, China or
any other country in large part because Commerce has not yet
promulgated the necessary regulatory procedures for assessing
such situations on an enterprise-by-enterprise basis. This contrasts
with the EU practice of affording producers of a 2000 case relating
to CD boxes market economy treatment under EC regulations first
published in 1999.83
Nevertheless, when Vietnamese industries are faced with
antidumping actions in the future, it will be well worth providing
factual data demonstrating that the particular industry under
investigation should be treated under market principles, to the
extent such data is persuasive. Eventually this is an area where
Commerce could become vulnerable in the WTO's Dispute
in ASEAN, although closer relations in other aspects of international trade are
contemplated. See Amy Tsui, U.S., ASEAN Officials Discuss Customs, Financing,
Environment Under ASEAN TIFA, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (May 6, 2010), available
at
http://Iawlibproxy2.unc.edu:2061/tdln/TDLNWB/split display.adp?fedfid=l7110242&v
name=itdbulallissues&wsn=497602500&searchid=12330824&doctypeid=l&type=date
&mode=doc&split-0&scm=TDLNWB&pg-0 (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
s1 See supra note 7.
82 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Anti-Dumping Manual, ch. 10, at 32-33 (2009)
available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/admanuallindex.html [hereinafter "Antidumping
Manual"]. MOI treatment is codified neither in the law nor the regulations, so its legal
status is somewhat unclear from the point of view of U.S. domestic law.
83 See New Market Economy Treatment Rules Set a New Way to Deal with Anti-
Dumping Procedures, Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Jan. 21, 2000, at 1,
available at http://info.hktdc.com/alertleu0002.htm (last viewed June 24, 2010).
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Settlement Body (as well as to domestic court challenge) with
regard to Commerce's refusal to find any MOIs in any case
involving either China or Vietnam. Although there is an important
legal issue of the producers meeting their burden of proof when
seeking to demonstrate that their industry follows market economy
principles, the adverse results of NME treatment should make this
effort a priority in appropriate cases. There is little doubt that in
most instances NME treatment results in much higher dumping
margins. For example, in an investigation relating to imports of
color television receivers from both China and Malaysia
concluded in 2004, where essentially identical products were
produced in China and Malaysia, the dumping margins for
Malaysian firms were de minimis (0.47 percent)84 while those for
China were predominantly in the twenty-two percent range.8 5
While other factors, including the willingness and ability of the
respondents to provide accurate data, may have affected the end
results, the difference in results more or less speaks for itself.
Separate rates. The presumptive approach for NME producers
in Commerce's AD investigations is to apply a country-wide
dumping margin to all of them on the ground that all are
government-controlled. However, if an NME producer can
demonstrate that it is not government-controlled, both as a matter
of law and in practice, Commerce will apply a separate, individual
rate in determining that producer's export price. (Separate rates
do not apply to the determination of normal value, to which export
price is compared to determine whether there are dumped sales,
i.e., sales in the export market at less than normal value).
Commerce has developed a "separate rates" test for
determining when such separate treatment is warranted. This
84 Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value:
Certain Color Television Receivers from Malaysia, 69 Fed. Reg. 25561, 25564 (May 7,
2004).
85 Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Color Television Receivers from the People's
Republic of China, 69 Fed. Reg. 31347-31348 (Jun. 3, 2004); Final Determination of
Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Negative Final Determination of Critical
Circumstances: Certain Color Television Receivers from the People's Republic of China,
69 Fed. Reg. 20594, 20597 (Apr. 16, 2004).
86 Antidumping Manual, supra note 82, at 3-6.
87 Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Non-Market Economy
Countries: Surrogate Country Selection and Separate Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. 13246, 13247-
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test focuses whether the company is a de jure or de facto
government-controlled entity.88 A lack of de jure governmental
control is indicated by (a) an absence of restrictions on its business
operations and exports; (b) any governmental legislation that
illustrates a lack of governmental control (for example,
privatization legislation); and (c) other governmental actions that
indicate that the company is not controlled by the government.8 9
Whether the NME government exercises de facto control is
indicated by (a) whether the company's export prices are set by
the government, (b) whether the company is free to negotiate and
sign contracts without government involvement or approval, (c)
whether the company may make autonomous decisions with
regard to management selection, and (d) whether the company
retains its export sales revenue and makes its own decisions
regarding how to use its profits or finance its losses.9 0
Separate rates were granted to many Vietnamese producers in
Frozen Fish Fillets and Shrimp and, as discussed in Part VI(B), in
the preliminary determination in PRCBs,91 separate rates have also
been granted to certain Chinese producers in U.S. AD actions
against China on a regular basis. This approach provides
cooperating and qualifying respondents an opportunity to
substantially reduce the uncertainties and inaccuracies on the
export price side of the equation, since by definition such
respondents have control over the prices at which they market
their products abroad.
B. Application of U.S. CVD Laws to NMEs
A closely-related matter is treatment of Vietnam under the
U.S. countervailing duty laws, directed at foreign imports that
13248 (March 21, 2007) [hereinafter Surrogate Country Selection]; Notice of Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Bicycles from the People's Republic of
China, 61 Fed. Reg. 19026, 19027 (Apr. 30, 1996).
88 See infra note 89.
89 Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Non-Market Economy
Countries: Surrogate Country Selection and Separate Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. 13246, 13248
(Mar. 21, 2007).
90 Id.
91 See PRCB Preliminary AD Determination, 74 Fed. Reg. 45811, at 56816 (Sept.
4, 2009).
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benefit from actionable government subsidies. 92 Here, the law
itself is silent on treatment of NMEs. In effect, Commerce has
discretion either to refrain from bringing CVD actions against
NMEs, as was the practice from the mid-1980s until 2006, or to
bring such actions as is current practice. Until 2006, Commerce
took the position that under U.S. law, countervailing duty actions
were not intended to apply to NMEs, a position that had been
upheld by U.S. courts.9' The essence of the Commerce rationale
was that it was impossible to determine the extent to which a
"bounty or grant" (subsidy) existed because the government rather
than market forces determined the costs of various inputs used in
the production of goods, and subsidies could not be separated from
other government directives and controls. Under such
circumstances, a NME country risked a methodology for
determining the existing of dumping that tended to exaggerate
actual dumping margins, but was essentially insulated from CVD
actions designed to offset government subsidies.
In 2006, Commerce changed its policy and initiated a CVD
investigation against coated paper from China. 94 While that
particular case was ultimately dismissed for lack of a
demonstration of material injury to U.S. producers, countervailing
duties (at rates of up to 615 percent) were applied to imports of
line pipe into the United States in a 2008 determination. 95 At least
nine CVD duty orders against China have been issued with
additional orders pending before Commerce.96 Also, Commerce is
being strongly urged by Congress to make the new NME CVD
policy applicable to all NMEs. China has challenged various
92 World Trade Organization, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, Part V [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
93 See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1309 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
94 Notice of Investigation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Coated Free
Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea,
71 Fed. Reg. 68546 (Nov. 27, 2006).
95 ITC Affirmative Injury Finding in Pipe Case Is First Time CVD Duties to Apply
to China, 25 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 960 (June 26, 2008).
96 See Commerce Dept., AD/CVD Orders in Place as of May 10, 2010, available at
http://info.usitc.gov/oinv/sunset.nsflOa9l5ada53el 92cd852566 1a0073de7d/96daf5a6cOc
5290985256a0a004dee7d/$FILE/orders%2OMay/ 2010%202010.xls (last visited Oct.
28, 2010).
97 Amy Tusi, Commerce Announces Significant Shift, Applies CVD Law in
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aspects of the United States' imposition of AD and CVDs against
China in the WTO, as applied in specific cases. 98
There are obvious conceptual inconsistencies between the use
of NME methodology in an anti-dumping case (relying on
surrogates because various input costs are not based on market-
determined prices) and the assertion that "private industry now
dominates many sectors of the Chinese economy" with a much
smaller role of government planners so that government subsidies
can be accurately measured. Although, to some extent Commerce
relies on surrogates to determine subsidy benchmarks as well. 99
However, Commerce's requirement that "significantly all" factor
input prices be market driven is ambiguous and may guarantee that
no such industries will be found.100 Consequently, a strict market-
oriented industry test as applied by Commerce virtually guarantees
that a market orientated industry will not be found in AD actions
against NMEs.' 0 Logically, under such circumstances, CVD law
should not apply because of the lack of market determination of
the price of inputs that might be considered government subsidies.
This disconnect is illustrated by the fact that some of the factors
cited justifying subjecting Vietnam to CVD laws directly in
PCRBs in 2009 despite the fact that Vietnam is now considered a
mixed economy in contrast with Commerce's NME determination
in the AD proceeding concerning Frozen Fish Fillets in 2002.
A more immediate threat to Commerce's methodology relates
to allegations that by imposing both AD and CVDs against NMEs,
Chinese Paper Case, 24 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 495, 498 (Apr. 5, 2007).
98 United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain
Products from China, WT/DS379/2, Dec. 12, 2008 [hereinafter US - AD/CVDs -
China].
99 Tatelman B. Todd, United States' Trade Remedy Law and NAIEs: a legal
overview, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL 33976, April 23, 2007, p.1 2,
available at www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/323 1.pdf.
100 Id. at 10. (citing Lawrence J. Bogard & Lind C. Menghetti, The Treatment of
NMEs under the US AD and CVD law: A petitioner's perspective, PLI Corp. Law and
Practice Course Handbook, Series No. 789, 6-7 (1992), available at
www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/323 1.pdf).
101 Joseph A. Laroski, NAEs: A love story NME and market economy status under
US AD law, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369, 396 (1999) (citing Robert H. Lantz, The
Search for Consistency: Treatment of NMEs in Transition under the US AD and CVD
law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POt'Y 993, 999 (1995)).
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Commerce is double-counting in contravention of GATT 1994.102
The GATT provides, "No product of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be subject to both anti-dumping and
countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of
dumping or export subsidization."' 03 In theory at least, there is no
potential double-counting with regard to domestic subsidies since
a domestic subsidy provided to an enterprise should benefit both
domestic and export sales in the same manner. 104 Commerce
generally avoids the double-counting problem in parallel AD/CVD
actions against market economy nations by adjusting for the
possible overlap of a benefit calculated as a result of a government
export subsidy and sales at less than fair value (dumping) to the
extent the dumping margins result from that same situation with a
setoff in appropriate circumstances. 105 The problem is more
complex in an NME situation where the distinctions between
dumping and subsidization on exported goods are more difficult to
distinguish, 106 and where the magnitude of dumping and the
amount of benefit are not based on actual prices and commercial
loan rates in the NME home market but on surrogate values
(dumping) and non-national benchmarks (subsidies), often based
on entirely different surrogate countries.
Because of the likelihood of double-counting, the U.S. Court
of International Trade ("CIT") recently reversed and remanded
Commerce's parallel AD/CVD findings against China. 107 The
court reasoned that unlike the situation in which the dumping
duties in parallel AD and CVD proceedings in a market economy
are calculated based on normal value and export price, in NME
actions, the export price is not being compared with the price of
102 See Le & Mai, infra note 243.
103 GATT 1947, art. VI.5.
104 Typically, the benefit from a domestic subsidy is allocated by Commerce overall
production, whether it is exported or sold domestically. An export subsidy by definition
benefits exports alone. See SCM Agreement, art. 3, supra note 92.
105 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C) (2000).
106 See Ross Denton, The NME rules of the EC's AD and Countervailing Duty
Legislation, 36 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 198, 236 (1987) (discussing the double-counting
problem).
107 GPX Intern. Tire Corp. v. U.S., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1251 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2009).
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the good in the domestic market, but rather, in a surrogate country
market which is presumably subsidy-free.1os Without adjustment
the court reasoned, such a situation could result in double-
counting.109 In the initial CIT proceeding, Commerce conceded
that it had not yet developed the necessary procedures for
analyzing such requests from individual enterprises. Judge
Restani found "that Commerce's failure to address GPX's request
for MOE status because it had no policies, procedures, or
standards for evaluating MOE status was arbitrary and capricious
and unsupported by substantial evidence.""l0 The Court, mindful
as well of the conceptual inconsistency, held that "[i]f Commerce
now seeks to impose CVD remedies on the products of NME
countries as well [as AD duties], Commerce must apply
methodologies that make such parallel remedies reasonable,
including methodologies that will make it unlikely that double
counting will occur.'
In the final CIT decision after remand Commerce is effectively
foreclosed from imposing CVDs on NMEs barring a change in
methodology, confirming what Judge Restani said in the initial
decision." If the CIT decision is ultimately upheld by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC"), some
modification of Commerce's methodology in numerous
simultaneous AD/CVD proceedings against China and Vietnam is
inevitable if Commerce intends to continue bringing CVD actions
against China while maintaining China's status as an NME for AD
actions. Whether Commerce can promptly develop procedures for
analyzing requests for individual market-oriented industry
treatment so that the firm could be analyzed under market
economy procedures, a deficiency that was also challenged in
GPX Tire, remains to be seen.
China is also challenging the double-counting in an "as such"
108 See id. at 1245.
109 See id. at 1234-35.
110 Id. at 1247.
111 Id. at 1243.
112 GPX Intern. Tire Corp. v. U.S., Consol. Ct. No. 08-00285, Slip. Op. 10-84 (Ct.
Int'l Trade Aug. 4, 2010).
113 GPX Tire, 645 F.Supp.2d. at 1246.
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claim before the WTO,1 4 which may provide alternative relief
even if the CAFC ultimately reverses the CIT. Even if Commerce
prevails in the U.S. courts, it may be less successful at the WTO,
meaning that an articulation of procedures will inevitably be
needed.
The pursuit of CVD cases with the use of surrogate country
methodology (particularly for determining "benchmark" rates) is
permitted by the WTO's SCM Agreement, 5 and under at least
one Appellate Body ruling, in Softwood Lumber, as discussed in
Part VII. Nor is there any apparent WTO bar to simultaneous
AD/CVD actions against NMEs, despite the economic
inconsistency of such actions. Rather it is the double-counting
problem that makes Commerce most vulnerable to challenge in
such situations.
IV. U.S. NME CVD Methodology and Practice - China
This article does not discuss NME CVD practice with regard
to China in detail. However, given the parallel approach to
Vietnam, a basic understanding of the development of
Commerce's policy regarding China is instructive.
From 1984 until the mid-1990s, Commerce generally followed
a practice of not initiating CVD actions against NMEs, based on
the Georgetown Steel case. However, in the so-called Georgetown
Steel memorandum in 2007,116 Commerce justified its change in
practice with respect to China. In the memorandum, Commerce
analyzed the rationale for excluding NMEs from CVD actions in
the 1980s (continuing into the 1990s). Commerce noted that in
1984 it had concluded that:
[T]he nature of the Soviet-style economies in the mid
1980s made it impossible for the Department to apply the
CVD law. To determine that a countervailable subsidy had
I14 US - AD/CVDs - China, supra note 98, at 7-8.
115 See SCM Agreement, art. 14(d).
116 Memorandum for David M. Spooner, CVD Investigation of Coated Free Sheet
Paper from the People's Republic of China - Whether the Analytical Elements of the
Georgetown Steel Opinion are Applicable to China's Present-Day Economy (Mar. 29,
2007) [hereinafter China DVD Applicability Memo] available at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-sep-rates/prc-cfsp/china-cfs-georgetown-
applicability.pdf.
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been bestowed, the Department needed to establish that:
(a) the NME government had bestowed a "bounty or grant"
on a producer; and (b) that the bounty or grant was
specific. The Soviet-style economies at the time made it
impossible to apply these criteria because they were so
integrated as to constitute, in essence, one large entity. In
such a situation, subsidies could not be separated out from
the amalgam of government directives and controls. 1 7
However, China (in 2007) is different:
The current nature of China's economy does not create
these obstacles to applying the statute. As noted above,
private industry now dominates many sectors of the
Chinese economy, and entrepreneurship is flourishing.
Foreign trading rights have been given to over 200,000
firms. Many business entities in present-day China are
generally free to direct most aspects of their operations,
and to respond to (albeit limited) market forces. The role
of central planners is vastly smaller . .. Given these
developments, we believe that it is possible to determine
whether the PRC Government has bestowed a benefit upon
a Chinese producer (i.e., the subsidy can be identified and
measured) and whether any such benefit is specific.
Because we are capable of applying the necessary criteria
in the CVD law, the Department's policy that gave rise to
the Georgetown Steel litigation does not prevent us from
concluding that the PRC Government has bestowed a
countervailable subsidy upon a Chinese producer." 8
Thus, Commerce determined that it had sufficient discretion to
apply CVDs to NMEs under applicable U.S. law (although it was
not required to do so), and that it was appropriate to use the CVD
laws against China, despite its NME status for AD purposes. This
approach has been followed in subsequent cases against China.119
Commerce reached similar conclusions when it conducted an
analysis of Vietnam in PRCBs and is following the same general
approach to CVD cases as with China.120
117 Id. at 10.
Its Id.
119 Id.
120 See infra Part V.
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Judging by the actions brought against China, the methodology
used by Commerce to determine whether a benefit is conferred by
a particular subsidy uses a mix of methodologies applied to market
economies and special rules designed for NMEs, in contrast to its
all or nothing approach in AD actions. For example, in Coated
Free Sheet Paper,121 Commerce calculated the benefit for certain
tax reductions provided to producers by comparing the normal tax
rate with the preferential tax rate, and treating the difference as the
benefit, as would have occurred in a normal ME CVD analysis.122
However, in certain areas, Commerce, as authorized in the
WTO Accession Agreement, rejected the use of Chinese
benchmarks because of alleged Chinese intervention in the
markets.123 For example, in determining the benefit for allegedly
preferential loan rates afforded to producers or exporters,
Commerce determined that there was no commercial, non-
preferential interest rate available in China.' 24 Instead, to create a
benchmark rate, Commerce analyzed the commercial interest rates
in thirty-three developing countries with per capita GDPs similar
to China's, with the composite interest rate being determined to be
7.56 percent (2005). ' The concept of rejecting national
benchmark rates is not confined to market economies, although it
is explicit in China's WTO Protocol of Accession. 126 In its
analysis of alleged Canadian subsidies of softwood lumber,
Commerce rejected the use of Canadian commercial rates for the
sale of standing timber, and relied instead on timber charges in the
United States as the benchmark.127
In Coated Free Sheet Paper, Commerce also considered as
subsidies various Chinese Government policies, such as providing
121 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic
of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 60645
(Oct. 25, 2007); Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet from the People's Republic of
China (Oct. 17, 2007) [hereinafter "Coated Free Sheet Paper Decision Memorandum"],
available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/fm/summary/prc/E7-21046-1.pdf.
122 Id. at 11.
123 Id. at 67.
124 See id.
125 Id. at 67.
126 See supra note 32, at Part II.A.
127 See supra note 32, at Part VI.
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preferential financing for the paper industry through various
mechanisms.128 Commerce concluded that this type of provision
"explicitly detail[s] an active role for the State in implementing
industrial policies, whether though industrial policy coordination
or through the guidance of financial resources towards those
industries that the State favors (such as large integrated paper
companies) and away from those the state considers outmoded."' 2 9
The investigation also gave particular attention to special
benefits conferred on foreign invested enterprises (FIEs), which
receive tax subsidies under Chinese law according to
Commerce.130  Despite the fact that FIEs in China cut broadly
across industry sectors, Commerce determined that the tax
subsidies they receive, despite their broad applicability and
transparent nature, are specific under the SCM Agreement, and are
thus countervailable.131
In dealing with upstream subsidies, in this case pulp log
producers, Commerce essentially followed its practice of
attributing such subsidies to downstream producers (in this case of
paper), as it has in similar cases involving market economies such
as Indonesia.132
The general approach of Coated Free Sheet Paper has been
followed by Commerce in other Chinese cases, as in the
September 2009 preliminary determination and December 2009
final determination in Oil Country Tubular Goods. 133 There,
128 Coated Free Sheet Paper Decision Memorandum, supra note 121, at 54.
129 Id. at 53.
130 Id. at 85.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 98.
133 See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the
People's Republic of China: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determination, Preliminary Negative Critical Circumstances Determination, 74 Fed.
Reg. 47210 (Sept. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Preliminary OCTG]; U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the People's Republic of China: Final
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 74 Fed. Reg. 64045 (Dec. 7, 2009)
[hereinafter Final OCTG]; Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final
Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain Oil County Tubular
Goods ("OCTG") from the People's Republic of China, at 103 (Nov. 23, 2009)
[hereinafter Decision Memorandum OCTG], available at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E9-28779-1.pdf.
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Commerce reiterated its policy of applying the CVD laws to China
and again used a non-Chinese interest rate derived from market-
based interest rates observed in a pool of lower-middle income
countries, also citing the methodology used in Softwood
Lumber. 134 As stated by Commerce in the Decision
Memorandum, "The Department continues to find that loan
benchmarks must be market-based and that Chinese interest rates
are not reliable as benchmarks because of the pervasiveness of the
GOC's intervention in the banking sector."' 35
V. U.S. Methodology and Practice - Vietnam: Polyethylene
Retail Carrier Bags (PRCBs)
PRCBs is important because it is to date (July 2010) the only
proceeding seeking the imposition of CVDs against Vietnamese
producers, and just the third seeking antidumping duties. 136 The
AD proceedings broke no new ground, in significant part because
Commerce was not required to review whether the Vietnamese
producers constitute a market-oriented industry, or re-evaluate its
application of NME criteria to Vietnam for the first time since
Frozen Fish Fillets. Once a non-market economy determination is
made it "remain[s] in effect until revoked," and no effort was
made to revoke that status in PRCBs.137 While the subsidy rates
were low, ranging from 0.20 percent to 4.24 percent for the three
firms specifically reviewed, and a rate of 2.97 percent applied to
other manufacturers in the preliminary determination' 38 and 0.44
percent to 5.28 percent in the final, 139 and the import volume less
than one percent of U.S. imports from Vietnam ($79 million).140
134 See Preliminary OCTG, supra note 136, at 47212, 47216.
135 See Decision Memorandum OCTG, supra note 136, at 103.
136 Petition filed by King & Spaulding, Mar. 31, 2009.
137 See "PRCB Preliminary AD Determination," supra note 9, at 56815;
Memorandum for Ronald K, Lorentzen, Countervailing Duty Investigation of
Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam - Whether the
Countervailing Duty Law is Applicable to Vietnam's Present Day Economy (copy on file
with author) [hereinafter Vietnam CVD Applicability Memo] (asserting that the AD
NME status issue is "separate and distinct" and that NME status will remain in effect for
Vietnam until a review is requested).
138 PRCB Preliminary CVD Determination, supra note 9, at 45820.
139 PRCB Final CVD Determination, supra note 10, at 16430.
140 See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Fact Sheet, Commerce Preliminarily Finds
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Still, the precedent will likely be applied to more economically
important proceedings in the future.
A. PRCBs - CVD Action
1. Applying CVD Law to Vietnam
Since Commerce had not initiated CVD actions against
Vietnam (unlike China) in the past, Commerce was effectively
required in PCRBs to determine whether U.S. CVD law applies to
Vietnam.141 In this case, as in initial CVD actions against China,
the U.S. petitioners argued that the conditions that led Commerce
to decline to initiate CVD investigations against the Soviet Union
over 20 years ago in Georgetown Steel, but to abandon with regard
to China in 2006, are analogously applicable to Vietnam.142 As
the notice in PCRBs observes:
The petitioners argue that the Vietnamese economy, like
China's economy, is substantially different from the
Soviet-style economy investigated in Georgetown Steel
and that the Department should not have any special
difficulties in the identification and valuation of subsidies
involving a non-market economy like Vietnam. Finally,
the petitioners contend that Vietnam's economy
significantly mirrors China's present-day economy and is
at least as different from the Soviet-style economy at issue
in Georgetown Steel, as China's economy was found to be
in 2007. The petitioners also argue that Vietnam's
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) allows
the Department to apply countervailing duties on imports
from that country. The WTO Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM Agreement),
similar to U.S. law, permits the imposition of
countervailing duties on subsidized imports from member
Subsidization of Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, at 9 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-vietnam-prcb-cvd-prelim-083109.pdf.
141 See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation and
Request for Public Comment on the Application of the Countervailing Duty Law to
Imports from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 74 Fed. Reg. 19064 (Apr. 27, 2009).
142 See id. at 19067.
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countries and nowhere exempts non-market economy
imports from being subject to the provisions of the SCM
Agreement. As Vietnam agreed to the SCM Agreement
and other WTO provisions on the use of subsidies, the
petitioners argue Vietnam should be subject to the same
disciplines as all other WTO members.143
Petitioners alleged as well that various Vietnamese
government programs constituted countervailable subsidies. 144
These included preferential lending for exporters; preferential
lending for the plastics industry; export promotion programs,
export bonus program; new product development program;
various income tax benefits for exporters, FIEs, FIEs operating in
encouraged industries and various import tax and VAT exemption
programs. 145 All of these were addressed in the preliminary
determination.
In the Preliminary determination of subsidies (and again in the
final), Commerce essentially agreed with the petitioners, but only
after a relatively thorough analysis of Vietnam's present-day
economy, with emphasis on the increased economic power of
domestic private and foreign invested enterprises while the
number of state-owned enterprises ("SOEs") had been reduced
from 12,000 to about 1,800 and correspondingly reduced
employment and total economic output.146 Commerce also noted
significant reforms in SOEs, but with limits on privatization
suggesting that the SOE sector will continue indefinitely. Among
other factors cited by Commerce as justification for applying CVD
laws to Vietnam were the partial deregulation of prices and
production inputs and increased participation of Vietnam in the
world economy. 147
143 Id.
144 See id. at 19066.
145 Id. at 19066-67.
146 Vietnam CVD Applicability Memo, supra note 137, at 4. Here, as with the
China CVD Applicability Memo, supra note 60, Commerce has made a practice of
addressing such issues separately from the formal preliminary and final determinations;
see, e.g., Issues and Decision Memorandum for Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination,
at 13 (Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter PCRB Final CVD Decision Memo), available at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/VIETNAM/2010-7395-1.pdf.
147 Vietnam CVD Applicability Memo, supra note 80, at 8-9.
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The result was a conclusion that Vietnam's economic space
today is a mixed landscape of public, private and foreign
ownership. The non-State sector has grown rapidly and accounts
for an increasing share of production, investment employment and
trade, although SOEs continue to play a significant role in the
economy. However, the economic reforms are incomplete and
structural and institutional legacy problems remain. 148
While the conclusions are to a considerable degree supported
by Commerce's careful analysis, they appear to reflect as well an
effort to provide a colourable basis for applying CVD laws while
at the same time avoiding to the extent possible erosion of the
rationale for treating Vietnam as an NME in antidumping cases.
This determination to apply the CVD laws to Vietnam was
unchanged in the final CVD determination, with Commerce noting
Congressional support for Commerce's decision to apply the CVD
laws in a situation parallel to China's, and concluding that "The
clear implication of these Congressional statements is that the
CVD law can be applicable to NMEs" and that "these
[Congressional] statements contemplate that the Department's
application of the CVD law to NMEs would take place
simultaneously with the continued application of the Department's
NME antidumping methodology."l4
2. Key Issues in the CVD Determination
In its preliminary and final determinations, Commerce for the
most part followed the same approach as in CVD actions against
China, including that in Coated Free Sheet Paper. Thus,
Commerce decided that it would apply CVD law to Vietnam only
as of Vietnam's accession to the WTO in January 2007, on the
ground that such limitation was "appropriate and administratively
desirable" and because Commerce concluded that Vietnam's
accession agreement "contemplate[s] application of the CVD
law."' 5 0 Commerce also found general support for bringing CVD
actions in the discussion of benchmarks in Vietnam's working
148 Id. at 11.
149 "PCRB Final CVD Decision Memo," supra note 10, at 14. Facts available were
used for one participant, API, for lack of cooperation.
150 "PRCB Preliminary CVD Determination," supra note 9, at 45814.
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party report, as quoted above.' 5 ' This timing issue did not arise
with regard to China, since China became a WTO Member nearly
five years before Commerce brought the first CVD action against
China, whereas Vietnam had been a member for only 15 months
before Commerce brought its first action.
As in Coated Free Sheet Paper, the choice of "benchmark"
rates for calculating the benefit from government loans was a
central issue in Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags. The general
"basket" approach was similar but only after Commerce
extensively reviewed Vietnam's banking sector to justify rejecting
Vietnamese lending rates as market-based and corresponding use
of an external benchmark. 152 In the memorandum, Commerce
reviewed various legal and banking reforms and for banks
"substantial flexibility in setting interest rates since 2002, although
such flexibility is limited . . .. Perhaps inevitably, Commerce
found it appropriate to begin its analysis of the banking system
with its non-market economy status determination in Frozen Fish
Fillets in 2002, setting forth its view of the changes in the ensuing
seven years. However, despite the changes, Commerce found,
inter alia, many "institutional weaknesses" as well as lack of
transparency and continued de facto benefits enjoyed by state-
owned commercial banks, and observed that the reforms "continue
to lag and remain incomplete." 54
In deciding to use a commercial benchmark, Commerce again
went beyond the borders of Vietnam. For dong-denominated
loans, Commerce put together a basket of currencies relying with
some exceptions on the World Bank's list of 54 "lower middle
income" countries. 155 In doing so, Commerce preliminarily
rejected both the "low income" countries for a variety of reasons,
151 See id.
152 Memorandum for Ronald K. Lorentzen, Countervailing Duty Investigation of
Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam - A Review of
Vietnam's Banking Sector (Aug. 28, 2009), at 9 [hereinafter Vietnam Banking Sector
Memo].
153 Id. at 5.
154 Id. at 7.
155 Memorandum through Mark Hoadley, Countervailing Duty Investigation of
Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam - Preliminary
Determination Calculations Loan Benchmark Analysis (Aug. 28, 2009), at 9 [hereinafter
Vietnam Loan Benchmark Memo].
119
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
even though Vietnam with its $890 per capita gross national
income ("GNI") is near the boundary between low income and
lower middle income, with the latter showing a per capita GNI of
$975.156 Once adjustments were made to exclude any NMEs in
the World Bank grouping, and others that had not reported local
currency lending rates, Commerce used a regression analysis to
determine a rate of 7.385 percent for 2007 and 4.165 percent for
2008 as the applicable benchmark. 157 For dollar-denominated
loans, Commerce used LIBOR rates with some adjustments.1 5 8
The determination that the plastics industry in Vietnam
receives preferential lending was based on an analysis of
"targeted" actions taken by state-owned commercial banks
("SOCBs") and coordinated by the State Bank of Vietnam rather
than on more direct government support. Commerce determined
that "the merchandise under investigation is part of a state
targeted, or encouraged, industry or project, and that there is
evidence that loans from SOCBs are a designated means for
developing that industry or project," despite the lack of a "single
policy document directing preferential lending . . 159 Since
SOCBs were determined to be public entities on the basis of their
majority ownership by the government, the loans provided by
SOCBs were considered government financial contributions.
Because the plastics industry was allegedly targeted, the loans
were considered specific under U.S. CVD laws in the preliminary
determination.161 However, in the final determination Commerce
concluded that plastics industry subsidized loans were not
available to PCRB products.' 62
Commerce's calculation of whether land was provided to
PRCB manufacturers at preferential rates so as to afford a benefit
was complicated by its conclusion that "the purchase of land-use
rights [in Vietnam] is not conducted in accordance with market
156 PRCB Preliminary CVD Determination, 74 Fed. Reg. 45811, 45815 (Sept. 4,
2009).
157 Vietnam Loan Benchmark Memo, supra note 155, at 2.
158 PRCB Preliminary CVD Determination, 74 Fed. Reg. at 45815.
159 Id. at 45816-17.
160 Id. at 45817.
161 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(i).
162 PCRB Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 10, at 18.
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principles." 163 This conclusion was based in part on the
observation that the land leased by the government to
intermediaries, and then subleased by intermediaries to producers,
had been expropriated from farming interests and the prices
charged by the government. The intermediaries "are based on
low-priced agricultural land tariffs determined without reference
to what is allegedly the most market-oriented portion of the
commercial land market" or by lease prices set by brokers for
subleasing tenants.' 64
Accordingly, and again using a methodology borrowed from
CVD actions against China, 65 Commerce used as an external
benchmark "comparable market-based prices in a country at a
comparable level of economic development that is within the
geographic vicinity of Vietnam.",1 66 However, Commerce rejected
the use of Thailand and the Philippines as benchmarks (as with
China) because of their relatively high per capital GNIs, $2,840
and $1,890 respectively.' 6 7 Rather, Commerce relied on rental
data from a country with a per capita GNI more similar to
Vietnam's. Commerce chose to use average rental rates for two
cities in India, Pune and Bangalore, noting that the per capita GNI
for India is $1,070, compared to $890 in Vietnam, even though the
population density in the Philippines was said to be a closer match
to Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam than with the two Indian cities.1 68
Using the Indian (Pune) rates as the benchmark, Commerce found
a land rental subsidy of 3.86 percent.' 69
Commerce also countervailed one producer, Fotai, which as a
Foreign Invested Enterprise ("FIEs") received certain income tax
preferences from the Vietnamese government that were limited to
FIEs. Here, Commerce ultimately calculated the amount of the
subsidy (0.21 percent) based on a comparison of the normal tax
163 PRCB Preliminary CVD Determination, supra note 9, 74 Fed Reg. at 45815.
164 PCRB Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 10, at 27.
165 See Preliminary - OCTG, supra note 133, at 47222 (determining to use Thailand
as a benchmark to address whether Chinese received benefits regarding land use rights).
166 PRCB Preliminary CVD Determination, supra note 9, at 45815.
167 Id. at 45816.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 45818.
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rate with the preferential tax rate. 170 Another producer, Chin
Shen, was also determined to benefit from other tax reduction
programs. 1 Finally, Commerce determined subsidies of 2.17
percent and 0.02 percent for Fotai based on exemption of raw
materials, certain imports of spare parts, and accessories from
import duties if the importer is located in an industrial zone.172
Commerce determined that the remission of the value added
tax on equipment at the time of importation was not
countervailable, and that a number of export promotion and tax
benefit programs were not actionable because the respondents had
not used them.173
Whether Vietnam is to be treated as a developing country for
purposes of Article 27 of the SCM agreement, thus eligible to
receive a 2 percent de minimis rate rather than the developed
country 1 percent de minimis rate, was not definitively resolved by
Commerce in the proceeding. The preliminary CVD
determination treated only one CVD rate below 1 percent as de
minimis1 74 (with a 1.69 percent rate not so treated). This was done
without comment by Commerce. In the final determination, the
only CVD margin below 2 percent was also below 1 percent.1
Consequently, Commerce formally treated the issue of rates
between 1 percent and 2 percent as moot, 176 leaving that
determination to the next CVD action but with a strong
implication that the more beneficial 2 percent rate will not likely
be applied to Vietnam.177
B. The Determination ofDumping
Unfortunately, the preliminary AD determination in PRCBs
provided no discussion of such key issues as choice of surrogate
170 Id. at 45817; PCRB Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 10, at 7.
171 PCRB Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 141, at 6-7.
172 Id. at 9-10.
173 PRCB Preliminary CVD Determination, 74 Fed. Reg. at 45819.
174 See PRCB Preliminary CVD Determination.
175 See PCRB Final CVD Decision Memo supra note 10 at 16340.
176 PCRB Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 10, at 15; see PRCB Preliminary
CVD Determination, supra note 9, at 45820.
177 PCRB Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 78, at 15; see PRCB Preliminary
CVD Determination, supra note 9, at 45820.
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country for factors of production because of the decision to use
adverse facts available (AFA). Nor was there any further analysis
of such issues in the final determination; the punitive AFA was the
basis of the final margins there as well.17 8 As Commerce noted in
the final determination, "Because no party submitted case briefs
and there are no other circumstances which warrant the revision of
the Preliminary Determination, the Department has not made
changes to its analysis, or the dumping margins calculated, with
respect to the Preliminary Determination." 7 9
However, Commerce confirmed in the preliminary
determination its willingness to use "separate rates" for calculating
export price for many Vietnamese respondents. 180 Otherwise
Commerce provided little new guidance as to how it will be
administering AD actions against Vietnam. As is normal practice
when there are numerous foreign producers, Commerce selects a
small number of major producers as mandatory respondents, in
this case API and Fotai Vietnam."s' Given that both withdrew
abruptly from the proceeding in September and October 2009,182
Commerce used the margin data provided by the petitioners as the
AFA rate. Thus, dumping margins of 76.11 percent, the highest
rate alleged in the petition was assigned to these two firms and for
a number of others that did not complete "quantity and value"
questionnaires sent to them.'8 3
For the group of respondent enterprises that both completed
Q&V questionnaires and made proper requests for separate rate
status, the margins were set at 52.3 percent.' 84 In reviewing
separate rate requests, Commerce divided the requesters into three
groups: producers that were totally foreign owned; joint ventures
of foreign and local enterprises or those locally owned by private
178 Telephone Interview with Zev Primor, Senior International Trade Analyst,
International Trade Administration (Nov. 9, 2009).
179 PRCB Final AD Determination, 75 Fed. Reg. 16434 (Apr. 1, 2010).
180 See PRCB Preliminary CVD Determination, 74 Fed. Reg. at 45820.
181 PCRB Preliminary AD Determination, 74 Fed. Reg. 56813, 56814 (Nov. 3,
2009).
182 Id. at 56815.
183 Id. at 56818.
184 Id. at 56817.
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groups; and those wholly owned or partially owned by the state.'85
With the group of wholly-foreign owned producers, and in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, Commerce effectively
presumed that the firms determined prices freely of Vietnamese
government control. For the separate rate applicants that were
joint ventures with Vietnamese owned companies or wholly-
Vietnamese owned companies, Commerce analyzed the relevant
de jure and de facto criteria for separate rates. 86 In finding an
absence of dejure government control, Commerce determined that
all had demonstrated a lack of restrictive stipulations in the
individual exporters' business and export licenses and legislation
as well as formal measures decentralizing control of the
Vietnamese companies.' 8 7
Commerce also determined that the applicants had
demonstrated the absence of de facto control, through showing
that each set export prices without government approval,
possessed the authority to negotiate and sign contracts and other
agreements, made autonomous decisions in selecting management
and in disposition of profits or financing of losses. 188 For the
applicants that were wholly or partially state-owned, Commerce
determined a similar absence of government control justifying the
use of separate rates. Only those companies not seeking separate
rates were assigned the Vietnam-wide government rates.
Unfortunately for the enterprises that qualified for separate
rates for determining export price, Commerce was determined to
use AFA, and choose the margin rates specified in the petition.
However, Commerce effectively rewarded those who had applied
for separate rates by setting their margin rates at a simple average
of the rates alleged in the petition (52.3 percent) instead of the
highest petition rate (76.11 percent) assigned as the Vietnamese-
wide rate and the rate given to the non-cooperating enterprises.189
The proceeding demonstrates that despite the lack of treatment of
industry sectors as market economy industries, Commerce remains
open to approving separate rate treatment of export price in
185 Id. at 56815-18.
186 PCRB Preliminary AD Determination, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56816.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 56817.
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appropriate circumstances.
C. The USITC's Material Injury Analysis
As might have been expected, the USITC found in its
preliminary determination that imports of PRCBs from Vietnam
(along with those from Indonesia and Taiwan) evidenced a
"reasonable indication" of material injury to U.S. producers. 190
More than ninety percent of the USITC's preliminary injury
findings are positive, not a surprising result given the low
threshold for a preliminary injury finding. However, several
factors in the preliminary finding suggested that a final injury
finding was not certain. The cumulation of imports from the three
foreign sources is standard practice. In this instance, the volume
of imports did not increase consistently over the three years of the
investigation, declining from 2007-2008, although the import
market share did rise.'9 Capacity utilization for the U.S. domestic
industry declined slightly, but remained relatively high, at 82.4
percent in 2008.192 Although it found causation of injury as a
result of imports, the USITC also noted that there was a seven
percent decline in overall U.S. consumption during the period,
which "may have had a role in the domestic industry's
deteriorating performance during the period of investigation." 93
There also remained questions as to the impact on the domestic
industry of "nonsubject imports," imports not subject to
antidumping or CVD investigations.
Nevertheless, in the final determination the USITC found by a
vote of 5-1 that imports of PRCBs constituted a threat of injury to
domestic producers.1 94 In reaching this conclusion the USITC
cumulated imports from Vietnam, Taiwan and Indonesia, although
Taiwan and Indonesia had been subject only to antidumping
investigations. The Commission's analysis was complicated by
190 U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Indonesia,
Taiwan, and Vietnam, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-462 and 731-TA-1156-1158, at 25
(Preliminary) (May 2009).
191 Id. at 20.
192 Id. at 23.
193 Id. at 25.
194 U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Indonesia,
Taiwan, and Vietnam, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-462 and 731-TA-I 156-1158 (Final) (Apr.
2010), at 38 [hereinafter USITC Final PRCB Determination].
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the fact that the industry's flattening or declining due to a variety
of factors, including environmental laws and increased use of
reusable bags, as well as a weak economy, increasing costs and
consumer perceptions. 195 Moreover, some of the U.S. PRCB
producers were themselves importing bags; the Commission
refused to discount those volumes. 196 Evidence of price
underselling was mixed; in some categories imported PRCBs were
higher in price than domestic products, and the Commission found
no evidence of price depression during the period, 197 but
concluded that price depression was likely in the future because of
the substitutability of imported product. Because of the many
factors other than imports affecting the health of the domestic
industry, the Commission could not "conclude that subject imports
contributed more than marginally or tangentially to any material
injury suffered by the domestic industry over the period."l 99
As is often the case in threat determinations, the Commission
also concluded that the principal foreign producers had both the
ability and incentive to increase exports to the United States, as
they were heavily dependent on the U.S. market.20 0 Relying on
evidence of excess capacity and the "vulnerability" of the
domestic industry, the Commission concluded that foreign
producers were likely to fill excess capacity by increasing exports
to the United States, and would have to undersell domestic
producers in order to do so. 201 Also, according to the
Commission, predicted flat or declining U.S. demand would not
"break the causal link" between imports and the "imminent" threat
of material injury.202
One commissioner dissented, concluding that imports from
producers not subject to the investigations were taking market
share not from domestic producers, but from producers in China,
Malaysia and Thailand that had been subject to antidumping
195 Id. at 20.
196 Id. at 23.
197 Id. at 30.
198 Id. at 31.
199 Id. at 36.
200 USTIC Final PRCB Determination, supra note 194, at 26.
201 Id. at 36.
202 Id. at 37.
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orders since 2004, and who had redirected production to Taiwan,
Indonesia and Vietnam. 20 3 The dissent also noted, inter alia, the
correlation between domestic production and changing U.S.
demand, reduced capacity utilization as a result of increased
domestic production capacity, and the improvement in the
domestic industry's operating margins in 2009. For the dissent,
there was "no likelihood of any imminent significant negative
impacts on the domestic industry from subject imports."205
Given that the USITC finds material injury or threat of
material injury in a substantial majority of the cases before it, it
was unlikely from the outset that Vietnam would avoid
antidumping and countervailing duties as a result of a negative
injury finding, despite the weaknesses in the domestic PRCB
producers' case for injury. Accordingly, antidumping and
countervailing duty orders, ordering the collection of cash deposits
on imports after May 4, 2010 in the amounts of 52.30 percent
(76.11 percent for firms treated in the aggregate as Vietnam-wide
entity) for antidumping duties and from 5.28 percent to 52.45
percent for countervailing duties (with one Vietnamese
respondent, Chin Sheng Company, Ltd., exempted from the order
because of a de mimimis 0.44 percent margin).206 There is no
indication that Commerce made any effort to avoid double
counting of elements in AD and CVD margins, making a WTO
challenge likely.
VI. U.S. Methodology and Non-National Benchmarks in
Market Economy Situations: Canadian Softwood
Lumber207
One of the most significant (of many) DSB challenges of U.S.
CVD laws is the softwood lumber dispute with Canada. It
203 See id. at 41-42 (dissenting views of Vice Chairman Daniel R. Pearson).
204 See id. at 50.
205 Id.
206 Antidumping Duty Orders: Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Indonesia,
Taiwan, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 75 Fed. Reg. 23667, 23669 (May 4,
2010); Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Countervailing Duty Order, 75 Fed. Reg. 23670, 23671 (May 4, 2010).
207 This section is adapted in part from GREGORY W. BOWMAN, NICK COVELLI,
DAVID A. GANTZ & IHN Ho UHm, TRADE REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICA, Ch. 12 (Ross
Buckley & Andreas Ziegler, eds., Kluwer Law Int'l, 2010).
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represents the longest-running (since 1982) and perhaps most
bitter trade dispute ever between the United States and Canada. 208
Unlike some others, the lumber dispute also affects a substantial
volume of trade.20 9 For many years Canada has been the major
source of lumber imported into the United States, 18 billion board
feet (BBF) in 2000 worth $7 billion, accounting for roughly thirty-
three percent of the U.S. lumber market. 2 10 Antidumping and
countervailing duty deposits worth approximately $5 billion were
collected on U.S. lumber imports from 2002 to 2006. Lumber
production has been a major part of the economies of British
Columbia (from whence about 60 percent of Canadian exports
originate) Ontario, Washington and Oregon, among other
Canadian and U.S. states and provinces. 2 11 Some seventy percent
of Canada's softwood lumber is exported to the United States, and
the United States is the only major market for Canadian lumber.2 12
Softwood Lumber is relevant to the other issues discussed in
this article because, with regard to the most significant element in
the CVD action, the United States used a non-national benchmark,
effectively treating the Canadian lumber sector as subject to NME
rules because the Canadian provinces effectively control the
market and set prices for standing timber sold to the industry, to
the virtual exclusion of commercial sources of standing timber.
Such treatment, as discussed below, is authorized under Article 14
213
of the SCM agreement. The proceeding also demonstrates that
the key "benchmark" issue is analogous to those raised in CVD
actions against China and Vietnam.
Accordingly, this section discusses only the CVD aspects of
the "Lumber IV" phase of the proceedings before the Commerce
Department that began in 2001, and only the non-national
208 Runsheng Yin and Jungho Baek, The US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade
Dispute: What We Know and What We Need to Know, 6 FOREST POL'Y AND ECONOMICS
129, 129-31 (2004).
209 See id. at 129.
210 Id. at 129-143.
211 Id. at 132.
212 M. Hart and B. Diamond, The Cul-de-Sac of Softwood Lumber, PUBLIC OPINION,
Nov. 2005, at 19.
213 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 14, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/24-scm.pdf.
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benchmark issue. 214 Lumber IV was initiated following the
215
expiration of a settlement agreement. The U.S. lumber industry,
supported by various environmental and aboriginal interests,
wasted no time after the expiration of the 1996 SLA; petitions
were filed on April 2, 2001.
A. Commerce's CVD Investigation
The most significant aspect of Commerce's final CVD
217 tadetermination, more so than the initial subsidy margins of 18.79
percent,218 was the position of Commerce on the issue of whether
a cross-border price comparison could be used to determine the
"benchmark" commercial price for harvested timber to be
compared against the allegedly subsidized Canadian provincial
government stumpage. 2 19 The essence of Commerce's position
was as follows:
In light of the objective [of the laws and regulations], we
agree that a market benchmark prices chosen from the
exporting country is preferable to a price chosen from
outside the country because it is more likely that such a
benchmark will more closely reflect, or be more easily
adjusted for, prevailing market conditions in the country of
provision in terms of overall price, quality, availability,
marketability, transportation and other conditions of sale.
214 The proceeding also resulted in several WTO rulings on the AD case and on the
threat of material injury determination by the U.S. International Trade Commission, as
well as a series of NAFTA, Chapter 19 and U.S. federal court determinations.
215 Softwood Lumber Agreement, U.S.-Can., May 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1195.
216 See U.S. Lumber Producers to File CVD, AD Case April 2 When U.S.-Canada
Agreement Expires, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 437 (Mar. 15, 2001).
217 Notice of Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final
Negative Critical Circumstances Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products
from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 15545 (Apr. 2, 2002). The detailed analysis is contained in
the accompanying unpublished decision memorandum (67 ITADOC 15545).
218 Gilbert Gagnd, The Canada- US Softwood Lumber Dispute: A Test Case for the
Development of International Trade Rules, 58(3) INT'L J. 335, 358 (2003), available at:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40203863 (Can.).
219 Issues and Decision Memorandum: Final Results of the Countervailing Duty
Investigation of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada from Bernard T.
Carreau, Deputy Assistant Secretary for ADICVD Enforcement II to Faryar Shirzad,
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration (March 21, 2001), available at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/canada/02-7849-1.txt; supra note 147.
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However, if there is no market benchmark price
available in the country of provision, it is obviously
impossible to determine adequacy of remuneration except
by reference to sources outside the country.220
Commerce concluded that there were no market-based internal
Canadian benchmarks because of the dominance of government
timber sales in the various provincial markets; under such
circumstances, "true market prices may not exist in the country or
it may be difficult to find a market price that is independent of the
distortions caused by the government's action. , American
stumpage (selling price for standing timber), in contrast, is a
reasonable benchmark.222 It is available to Canadian as well as
U.S. producers and some Canadian producers have purchased U.S.
stumpage.223 Also, the timber stands are comparable.
Softwood Lumber demonstrated that Commerce is prepared to
exercise considerable discretion in making CVD determinations,
regardless of the exporting country, even if that means that a
market economy, such as Canada, is treated otherwise in particular
circumstances and with regard to specific determinations of
benefits.
B. The WTO Appellate Body Decision
Of the multiple challenges to United States administrative
decisions, Canada's WTO challenge to Commerce's final CVD
determination produced the most significant victory for the United
States in terms of confirming, at least in principle, the right of the
United States to use a non-national benchmark.224 For Canada,
there was little to welcome. First, the Appellate Body (like the
Panel) rejected Canada's challenge to Commerce's conclusion that
when a province provides standing timber to a timber harvester in
a stumpage program, it is a "good" that, when provided by the
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 See id.
223 See id.
224 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Final Countervailing Duty
Determination With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada,
WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispue/casese/ds257_e.htm.
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government, constitutes a "financial contribution" within the
definition of a subsidy in the SCM Agreement. 225 More
significantly (and highly relevant for U.S. CVD actions against
China and Vietnam), the Appellate Body explicitly confirmed that
despite the directive in SCM Agreement Article 14(d), "[t]he
adequacy of remuneration shall be determined in relation to
prevailing market conditions for the good or service in question in
the country of provision or purchase." 226 The United States could
"use a benchmark other than private prices in the country of
provision, when it has been established that private prices of the
goods in question in that country are distorted, because of the
predominant role of the government as a provider of the same or
similar goods." 227
However, the Appellate Body did not "complete the legal
analysis" (due to lack of sufficient facts in the record before the
panel and transmitted to the Appellate Body) and determine
whether or not Commerce's use of U.S. stumpage was an
appropriate benchmark under the circumstances of the present
case. One can speculate that in the pending WTO action by
China against the United States, the United States will point to
Softwood Lumber as evidence that the United States is not
discriminating against China in its CVD methodology (at least
regarding this issue).
In the only other issue of major importance, the Appellate
Body upheld Canada's demand that when considering whether
alleged subsidies affect certain log and lumber producers it must
do a pass-through analysis.229 Where a timber harvester sells
some logs to unrelated sawmills, the Appellate Body concluded
that Commerce had improperly failed to conduct a pass-through
analysis to determine whether the subsidy to the timber harvesters
was passed through to the unrelated purchasers of the logs. 230
However, where the timber harvester processes the logs it
225 Id. 76; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art.
1.1 (a)(1)(iii), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/24-scm.pdf.
226 Id. 85.
227 WT/DS257/AB/R, supra note 224, 1 103.
228 Id. at T 122.
229 See id. 1146.
230 See id. 155- 157
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purchases into softwood lumber, and sells that lumber to other
mills for further processing, no pass-through analysis is
necessary. In the latter situation, the products of both the timber
harvesters and remanufacturers were subject to the investigation,
and there is thus no need to analyze pass-through between
producers of products subject to the investigation.232 This reflects
treatment of the "upstream subsidies" issue that has been a factor
in several Chinese cases, but not in PCRBs.
The United States purported to comply with the WTO
determination when it issued its compliance determination, 233 but
Canada objected to Commerce's failure to carry out the pass-
through analysis properly and its failure to apply that analysis to
the first administrative review of the CVD order. The Appellate
Body upheld the panel determination that the first review was
required to incorporate the pass through analysis and thus was
235
within the scope of the 2005 (Article 21.5) proceedings.
Because of the 2006 settlement agreement, the United States and
Canada consented to discontinue all pending WTO actions
concerning softwood lumber.236
VII. WTO Challenges to U.S. Methodology
While China is not effectively able to attack U.S. NME
methodology in AD and CVD cases in principle, it has recently
filed a broad challenge to such methodology "as applied" in four
237AD/CVD actions.23 The issues raised include the treatment of
231 See id. 158.
232 See id.J 159 - 165.
233 See 232 Uruguay round Agreements Act § 129, 19 U.S.C. § 3538 (1994).
234 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Final Countervailing Duty
Determination With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, Recourse by
Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS257/AB/RW (Dec. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/casese/ds257 e.htm.
235 See id. 90-92. DSU, art. 21.5 provides the opportunity for further
panel/Appellate Body review when Members disagree on whether the measures taken to
comply with a WTO agreement by the responding party are consistent with the
recommendations and rulings of the original panel/Appellate Body reports.
236 See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, United States - Final
Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from
Canada, WT/DS257/26 (Oct. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispue/cases-e/ds257_e.htm.
237 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by China, United States - Definitive
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SOEs as public bodies that provided goods at less than adequate
remuneration; provision of land rights at concessional rates;
treatment of commercial banks as "public bodies" that are
"entrusted and directed" to provide loans [at preferential rates] to
specific industries; the use of benchmark rates outside of China for
determining benefits; and failure to provide proper consultation
with the Chinese government. 238 A similar challenge was lodged
in July 2009 against the EU Commission's actions.239 Many of
these same objections are likely to be present when CVD actions
are eventually challenged in the DSB by Vietnam.
One of the areas in which the United States may ultimately be
vulnerable, relates to paragraph 15(a)(i) of the Accession
Agreement, which appears to contemplate an analysis by the
investigating authority as to whether market conditions may
prevail in the specific industry under investigation. 240 It is telling
that Commerce has not found this to be the case in any of the
dozens of antidumping actions brought against Chinese producers,
although the burden of proof is not with Commerce but with the
Chinese producers to demonstrate ME status in their industry
sector. Commerce continues to take the position, despite its
change in policy with regard to CVD actions that China (like
Vietnam) remains an NME. 24 1 Thus, in a recent case, Commerce
stated that "the limits the GOC [Government of China] has placed
on the role of market forces are not consistent with recognition of
China as a market economy under the U.S. AD law."242
Independent of this issue is the question of double counting of
AD and CVD margins, given the difficulty of determining in an
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379
(Dec. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu_e/cases e/ds379_e.htm.
238 Id.
239 See Request for Consultations by China, European Communities - Definitive
Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/1
(Aug. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispue/cases e/ds397_e.htm.
240 Accession Agreement, Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432
(Nov. 23, 2001) available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/acc-e/completeacc-e.htn#vnm.
241 See Coated Free Sheet Paper Decision Memorandum, supra note 121, at 36.
242 Id. at 37.
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NME situation the extent to which a domestic subsidy may also be
reflected in dumping margin analysis. 243 As with China, it
remains extremely difficult, because of the WTO Accession
Agreement for Vietnam, to challenge "as such" the application of
CVDs to Vietnam and its producers. Rather, Vietnam will likely
choose to focus on "as applied" issues when and if the appropriate
Commerce action is presented. 244 This limited opportunity for
challenge is reflected in Vietnam's first request for consultations
relating to U.S. AD (but not CVD) practice. 245 In US - Shrimp
(Vietnam), Vietnam has restricted itself to challenging the U.S.
practice of "zeroing," already the subject of nearly a dozen
successful WTO challenges by market economies, 246 and to
raising a number of technical issues. 24 7
VIII. Conclusion
The CVD action against Vietnamese PRCB producers
furnishes considerable insight as to the precise methodology
Commerce will likely use in future CVD investigations against
Vietnamese producers. Not surprisingly that methodology closely
tracks the methodology used for China, both with regard to the
initial decision to apply the U.S. CVD laws to Vietnam, and in
determining which alleged subsidies are actionable and what
benchmarks to use in calculating the benefit, if any, conferred,
particularly with regard to interest rates. As with China,
Commerce will likely use a mix of Vietnamese and surrogate data
for the determination, perhaps with greater reliance on surrogate
243 For a detailed discussion of the double-counting issue, see Thi Anh Nguyet Le
and Hong Quy Mai, Double Counting in the US Legislation against Non-Market
Economies: 'As Such' and 'As Applied' Analysis, 7 MANCHESTER J. INT'L EcoN. L. 71,
75 (2010).
244 PRCBs will likely not be such a case as the Vietnamese respondents appear to
have abandoned efforts to defend their interests against U.S. authorities.
245 See Request for Consultations, United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam, WT/DS404/1 (Feb. 1, 2010), available at:
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/cases-e/ds404_e.htm.
246 Raj Bhala & David Gantz, WTO Case Review 2009, 27 ARIz. J. INT'L &COMP. L.
85, 152-77 (2010).
247 See Request for Consultations by Viet Nam, United States - Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam, WT/DS404/1 (Feb. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu~e/cases e/ds404_e.htm.
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data for dealing with possible subsidies in real estate. Softwood
Lumber nevertheless remains the first major use by Commerce of
non-national (surrogate) data for determining benchmarks in U.S.
CVD actions.
The dumping determination in PRCBs provides no useful
indication of the extent to which Commerce is willing to recognize
Vietnam's movement toward market economy status, since the
existing NME status was not challenged by respondents in the
proceeding. Ironically, only the discussion of the use of CVD
actions against Vietnam reflects recognition by Commerce, albeit
indirectly, of the progress Vietnam is making toward market
economy status. That determination also leaves open the logical
economic disconnect between AD actions using NME surrogate
country methodology and CVD actions based in part on the use of
national data to calculate the benefits derived from government
subsidies. Notwithstanding this dichotomy one can be reasonably
sure that parallel AD/CVD actions will be the rule rather than the
exception with U.S. unfair trade actions against both China and
Vietnam until the Accession Agreement authorization for such
treatment expires in 2015 and 2018, respectively, despite the
possible success of "as applied" WTO challenges to subsidiary
issues such as double-counting.
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